3.5 I Thought I'd Probly Die In Prison, Expensive Taste In Women

1. Why does the number of Senators retiring and becoming lobbyists vary more than the number of House members doing so?
2. Why does  this data underestimate the number of Congressmen  who leave the legislature to become lobbyists?
3. Which Congressmen are most likely to become lobbyists?
4. Why do they typically end up being generic “lobbyists for hire” rather than lobbying for very specific causes?
5. What effect do these “revolving door lobbyists” have on policy making?
6. Describe the disparity in the amount of money involved in corporate lobbying and public interest lobbying.
7.  The author suggests that this is not an easily solvable problem.  What does he say would improve the situation?

1. It varies more since fewer senators retire each year making percentages more easily affected by small changes.

2.Since the data only shows registered lobbyists, while many preexisting lobbyists choose not to register.

3. Retiring congressmen, and congressmen who do work similar to that of the lobbyists, are more likely to become lobbyists.

4. Former members usually specialize in access, leaving "them" to sell to multiple clients.

5. It was shown that the side with more former government official lobbyist won more often than not. It was also shown that the side which had revolving door lobbyists was more likely to get earmarks, than the other side.

6. For every one dollar that public interest lobbying spends, corporate lobbying spends thirty four dollars. At least some of this is due to corporate lobbying spending money on the former, experienced members of Congress.

7. It would help if former congressmen use their connections and experience to help public interest lobbying rather than corporate lobbying (but if they did this, we all know they wouldn't make as much guap).